University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiCen

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

12-23-1987

Editorial: The Miranda Revelations And The
Nicaraguan Revolution
Deborah Tyroler

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/noticen
Recommended Citation
Tyroler, Deborah. "Editorial: The Miranda Revelations And The Nicaraguan Revolution." (1987). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/
noticen/1186

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiCen by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 075607
ISSN: 1089-1560

Editorial: The Miranda Revelations And The Nicaraguan
Revolution
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, December 23, 1987
, LADB Associate Editor It was Thursday, Dec. 10, the last day of the Washington summit. The I.N.F.
treaty had been signed. A Moscow summit for 1988 was scheduled, at which a 50% reduction in
strategic nuclear weapons would be a central issue. Now other matters were under discussion,
among them Central America. According to President Reagan, General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev expressed his willingness to halt arms shipments to Nicaragua, except for "policetype weapons." Reagan said that Gorbachev made no explicit demand for any US action as part
of a deal. A different account came from Moscow. Boris Pyadyshev, a Soviet Foreign Ministry
spokesman, said that the President's account was "at odds with reality." "First, our idea is related to
the entire Central American region. Second, it provides for reciprocal Soviet and American pledges
to refrain from deliveries of weapons," he said. Should such an agreement be reached, the most
critical element of the Arias plan would be realized. Whatever Gorbachev said, the President did
not respond. Nor did he mention a certain Roger Miranda, a high-level Nicaraguan military officer,
who had defected to the United States on Oct. 24, and who was at the time was holding a press
conference in the offices of Elliott Abrams at the State Department. Reporters from the New York
Times, The Washington Post, the Associated Press, and Time Magazine, were recording a dramatic
story that would certainly guarantee Congressional support for the contras, if it were verified.
Unbeknownst to the reporters, Elliott was uneasy. Miranda had failed at least one polygraph test,
and his charges strained credulity. State could not believe that this tiny country of 3,000,000 planned
to build up its armed forces to 600,000; to obtain MIG-21B's and other sophisticated arms from
the Soviet bloc; and, in the event of a US invasion, launch a land offensive against Honduras and
bomb Costa Rica. Would the Sandinistas commit their forces to a stand-up battle against the most
powerful war machine in the world thereby inviting decimation and closing off their ability to
conduct the kind of guerrilla war that had overthrown Somoza? How would bombing Costa Rica
help? Miranda's story not only sounded like fiction, but Abrams knew it to be fiction. Later, the
Pentagon was to admit (Dec. 17) that many of Miranda's charges were "speculative." Officials,
under pointed questioning by reporters, reluctantly confirmed that they were not taking all that
Miranda said at face value. Nonetheless, the decision to publicize the Miranda charges was taken.
The House had already passed a catch-all $606 billion appropriations bill that provided nothing
for the contras no military aid, no non-arms aid, no support whatever. Miranda's story, no matter
how unbelievable, might be sufficient to get contra aid passed before its utter irrationality became
obvious. Nor was it likely that Congress would take a careful look at the Miranda story with the
Christmas adjournment their first priority. The Administration has already won a partial victory.
Without waiting for the outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks on Central America, the Senate
voted for the omnibus appropriations bill on Dec. 9. The bill included $16 million in "non-lethal"
aid for the contras and permitted the delivery of "previously purchased" military equipment. The
Senate stand-up vote of 72-21 was unusual. The tally was recorded but not how individual Senators
voted. Given the probability that the Senate was aware of Miranda's charges before Dec. 9, it is
of some interest that Senators still did not wish to go on record for contra aid. The interview with
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Miranda was to be withheld from publication until the following Monday, Dec. 14, so that Time
could publish the story on the same day as the other media. But the Post immediately submitted a
series of written questions to Humberto Ortega, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, that revealed
the essence of Miranda's charges. On Saturday Dec. 12, Humberto Ortega gave a speech that was
broadcast over the Sandinista radio in Managua. He said, that the Government was engaged in a
massive, long-term military buildup with the objective of putting up to 600,000 men under arms by
1995 and equipping the Sandinista armed forces with advanced Soviet-made MIG fighter planes,
anti-aircraft missiles, tanks, armored vehicles and artillery. He said, "let the gringos know that this
is not Grenada." The most dramatic of the Miranda's charges were seemingly confirmed. Sen. Pete
Domenici (R-NM) said, "I was very proud of the Sandinistas over the weekend, they made it very
easy for us." Nor did the statement by President Daniel Ortega on Dec. 14, do much to mitigate
the impact of his brother's speech. He said the plan for a military buildup was only a "proposal"
and that if the regional peace plan were successful, there would be no reason to implement the
"contingency" plan. There was less than unanimity in Congress even after the confirmation of
some of Miranda's charges by the Ortega brothers. An aide to House Speaker Jim Wright said,
"I'm sure the people eager to continue the war will find (Miranda) useful...But I don't think it will
have any significant impact." Nevertheless, the House-Senate conference committee ultimately
approved (Dec. 20) contra aid to the tune of $8.1 million, including delivery of arms "previously
purchased." The "compromise" was made despite the release on Dec. 19 of the translation of the
document that Miranda had brought to Washington. It portrays the Sandinistas as short, not only
of weapons and ammunition, but also food, clothing and medicine and almost totally dependent
on the Soviet Union for supplies that have been delivered erratically and unreliably. The document
reflects fear of a US invasion that would follow what its authors believe will be the defeat of the
contras by 1990. The Sandinistas then plan to shift equipment and training of their main units, about
80,000 men, from unconventional warfare to a more conventional pattern. The plan also calls for
the formation of "100 new battalions of local forces arming them with rifles," during the period
1991-1995. Rather than an offensive force these battalions "shall enhance the country's capacity for
waging the people's national patriotic war..." That appears to be a euphemism, writes The New
York Times, for guerrilla war against an invader. "The plan contradicts the US view of an offensive
threat." If the Sandinistas are not planning the suicidal militarily stance that Humberto Ortega
remarks seemed to suggest, why did he make his speech of December 12? Why did he not say
what the US so belatedly made public? Why did President Daniel Ortega on Dec. 14 lend a kind
of credence to his brother's remarks? True, the Sandinistas never believed that they could prevent
Congress from providing some contra aid. But exposure of Miranda's lies could only help mobilize
US public opinion in the continuing fight against Reagan's policy and for the Arias plan. And in the
final analysis the American public will decide whether or not the Arias plan can succeed. Could the
military and political difficulties that the Sandinistas face be so critical, that they could not afford,
for reasons of morale, to do anything but strike a "macho" stance? Is the situation in Nicaragua as
fluid as James LeMoyne of the New York Times claims? Is the economy so close to collapse, the
internal opposition so powerful, that the main danger is now internal? Were the remarks of the
Ortegas directed to these concerns, not to the U.S. Congress? So it would appear. A loss of faith in
the promise of the Sandinista revolution or in its ability to stave off US aggression may be what the
Ortegas were fighting. "My members no longer have any faith in the Sandinistas' ability to offer
a short-, middle- or a long-term solution to the country's problems," said Carlos Salgado, head of
the General Confederation of Workers, and a past supporter of the Sandinistas. If the economic
conditions are so catastrophic, if faith in the viability of the revolution is being lost, will "machismo"
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help? Apparently the Ortegas feel they must try. They must have internal support to survive while
the Arias plan remains a possibility, even if negotiations drag on for months. They know that in the
long run only an end to US intervention, Soviet aid notwithstanding, will permit the Nicaraguan
revolution to regain the strength, and the public support required to advance their programs for
basic human needs that they had so optimistically and successfully initiated in the early days of the
revolution. It now seems that the fate of the Arias plan will be determined in Congress in an up-ordown vote on contra aid sometime in early February. Those who support peace in Central America
and the opportunity for the Nicaraguans to build a free and humanistic society, have their work cut
out for them and little time to lose.

-- End --
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